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On December 30,1996, a few dozen protesters gathered to demonstrate outside the 
offices of Indonesia's leading Islamic newspaper, Republika, in the southern suburbs of 
the capital city of Jakarta.1 The protesters were from a coalition of some eighteen 
Muslim organizations, all with spiritual ties to the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (Indonesian Counsel for Islamic Predication, or DDII), one of Indonesia's 
leading organizations for reformist Islam. On this occasion there was little of the 
tension characteristic of the group's earlier protests against the Muslim daily. Some 
months earlier, on April 17, 1995, the protest had become so heated that newspaper 
staff feared the demonstrators might ransack the building (a charge that the DDII 
leaders dismiss as ludicrous).2 This time the demonstrators were careful and orderly, 
behaving as if they were playing parts in a scripted affair. They carried banners and 
chanted slogans, and presented Republika officials with letters of protest detailing their 
objections to the Muslim daily's coverage. They also carried copies of the articles they 
viewed as having offended the Muslim community, and photocopies of letters sent 
earlier in the month by leading reformist personalities (most, again, with cordial ties to 
the DDII) expressing similar outrage at Republika's reporting.
By the standards of Indonesian politics during 1996, the demonstration this bright 
December morn was a tame affair. After all, this was a year that had begun with the 
government-engineered overthrow of the popular leader of the Indonesian Democratic
1 1 would like to thank John Bowen, Jeroen Peeters, and Dale F. Eickelman for comments on this paper, an 
earlier version of which was presented at the conference, "Mass Media and the Transformation of Islamic 
Discourse," International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, March 24,1997.
2 Interviews with Republika reporters, June 11,1995.
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Party (PDI), Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia's first president, 
Soekarno. Megawati ran afoul of government officials when her rising popularity 
began to raise doubts about the ability of the ruling party, Golkar, to win the 1997 
elections in the populous provinces of East and Central Java. Secret polls 
commissioned by Golkar strategists in early 1995 indicated that the party was running 
behind Megawati's Democratic Party in East Java, and was in serious trouble in 
Central Java as well.3 Party strategists were thus instructed to come up with a plan to 
oust Megawati. In early 1996 they arranged for a special convention of the Democratic 
Party at which a new, pro-government leader was elected; the outcome was a foregone 
conclusion because Megawati's followers were excluded from the event. Over the next 
few months, Megawati's supporters continued to mount effective resistance against 
her government-installed replacement, maintaining control of many of the PDI's 
regional branches and its national headquarters in Jakarta. Irritated by this standoff, on 
July 27 the government-backed PDI faction, supported by security officials and street 
thugs (preman) hired for the occasion, attacked the PDI's Jakarta headquarters where 
Megawati supporters had continued to hold rallies and give speeches. Three people 
died in the attack, and more than twenty were officially listed as "disappeared." Over 
the next two days, Jakarta was shaken by its worst political riots in more than twenty 
years, as thousands of angry PDI supporters, joined by residents of Jakarta's slums, 
took to the streets, ransacking government offices and setting fire to businesses owned 
by people with ties to the regime.
Over the next few months, Megawati supporters kept up a campaign of nonviolent 
resistance against the new party leadership. In the short term, however, the 
government stratagem seemed to have succeeded, though at an unexpectedly high cost 
to the Soeharto regime's international image. Through a series of arrests and press 
campaigns, the government also took advantage of the opportunity to crack down on 
left-leaning elements of the pro-democracy and labor movements, both of whom had 
rallied to the Megawati cause. In the words of one of Indonesia's most respected 
human-rights lawyers, Adnan Buyung Nasution, these shocking events left Indonesia's 
small pro-democracy movement thoroughly "disoriented" and "without any idea as to 
what to do next."4
This was not the only violence in 1996. In a country internationally renowned for 
its many courageous advocates of Muslim tolerance, 1996 had seen the worst incidents 
of putatively "anti-Christian" violence in the fifty-year history of the Indonesian 
Republic. There had been scattered church burnings in 1994, but few people were 
prepared for the enormity of violence that began in the middle of 1995 and intensified 
throughout 1996. All together, in an eighteen month period, some two hundred 
Christian churches were damaged or destroyed.5 The worst of these incidents took
3 Anonymous interview with Golkar official on June 17,1995.
4 Interview, January 4,1997. Nasution also observed that he felt the prodemocracy movement had erred in 
placing all of its hopes on the PDI as the locomotive of democratic reform. He argued that democratization 
had to be pursued on several fronts, including legal and electoral. He regretted that some of Megawati's 
younger supporters had unrealistically believed that everything could be changed at once. In the 
aftermath of the July 27 affair and in the run-up to a post-Soeharto era, he felt that it was important to 
dialogue with people from varied backgrounds, including government and military officials.
5 Not all of the violence, it should be emphasized, featured "Muslims" against "Christians." In the 
troubled province of East Timor, residents protesting continuing military repression in their province
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place in 1996 in the cities of Surabaya, Situbondo, and Tasikmalaya on the island of 
Java. In each of these cases, small incidents—which typically did not pit Muslims 
against Christians, but instead involved local Muslims clashing with police or civil 
authorities—then escalated into large-scale violence aimed at government officials, 
wealthy Chinese, and Christians.
The scope and intensity of the violence, and the surprising inability of state 
authorities to contain it, caused much soul-searching among Muslim intellectuals, 
many of whom have long taken justifiable pride in modern Indonesia's record of 
multireligious tolerance. Among journalists and politicians, however, the riots gave 
rise to charges and countercharges that the violence was in fact engineered by a third 
party. Officials sympathetic to the government-sponsored Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) insisted that the culprits had nothing to do with the 
Muslim community but were underground remnants of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI). Authorities hostile to ICMI, however, typically offered a different 
explanation, arguing that the violence was the work not of the communist 
underground but of extremist hardliners in the Muslim community. Though radically 
different in their conclusions, these interpretations agreed in seeing the violence as not 
merely an expression of "anti-Christian" sentiment, but of behind-the-scenes power 
struggles.
It is this larger background that made the demonstration outside the Republika 
offices so interesting. Whereas earlier demonstrations had faulted the newspaper for 
reporting on "un-Islamic" entertainments (such as Indonesian soap operas, Western 
films, and modern dance troupes) and for its "tendency to adopt a cosmopolitan 
attitude,"6 the December demonstration condemned the Republika staff for their biased, 
"left-leaning" (kiri-kirian) coverage of the PDI violence and recent urban riots. In what 
follows, I want to describe these grievances, and the differences of ethical and political 
vision to which they testify. Having elsewhere discussed ICMI, the organization to 
which Republika is linked,7 my primary focus in the following discussion will be on the 
Dakwah Council or DDII. In many respects studying the interactions between this 
organization and the Soeharto government provides the best illustration of the scale 
and ambiguity of the government's shift in attitude toward the Muslim community. It 
also illustrates the as yet uncertain outcome of that evolution.
From a comparative perspective, finally, this Indonesian example illustrates the 
centrality of print media in the struggle for public opinion in the Muslim world, and 
the obstacles to developing an open and pluralistic "public sphere" in situations of
went on a rampage against Muslim immigrants, whom they claimed were being recruited to the region so 
as to change its ethnic and religious balance. Muslim mosques and shops were burned, provoking outrage 
among Indonesian Muslims and causing some Islamic leaders to accuse the human rights community of a 
double-standard when it came to protecting the rights of Muslims.
6 See, for example, the text of the April 1995 "Letter of Concern," reprinted in Media Dakwah, No. 271 
(January 1997): 19-20.
7 See Robert W. Hefner, "Islam and Democratization in Indonesia," in R. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, 
Islam in an Era o f Nation States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 75-127.
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authoritarian control.8 In Indonesia and other majority-Muslim societies, the expansion 
of mass education in the aftermath of the Second World War played an important role 
in facilitating the establishment of new Muslim print media. Mass education created a 
public eager to consume Islamic works and open to new perspectives on politics and 
society. These developments also created conditions for the ascent of a new category of 
religious leader, different in worldview and political commitment from the carefully 
trained scholars (ulama) of traditional Islam.9 As Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori 
have highlighted in their recent Muslim Politics, these events combined to fragment 
religious authority among Muslims, unleashing "competition and contest over both the 
interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that 
produce and sustain them."10
Few institutions are of more critical importance in this contest of meanings than the 
varied print media through which Muslims disseminate and debate alternative visions 
of Islam and nation. In Indonesia, the dispute between the DDII and Republika provides 
an unusually clear prism through which to assess such ideological divides and the 
competing religious authorities of which they are part. The conflict also says much 
about the manner in which these divisions are being drawn into a high-stakes struggle 
over the role of Islam in a post-Soeharto era.
The DDII and the Modernist Travail
Sometimes portrayed by Western analysts as a "fundamentalist" organization, the 
Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDII) is, in fact, an umbrella association of 
reformist Muslims with varied temperaments and political ideals.11 Beyond their
8 Though I do not develop its theoretical terms in this essay, the concept of "public sphere" to which I 
refer involves a sphere of open and unconstrained communication outside of the state (and thus in "civil 
society"), in which citizens exchange and debate ideas relevant to civil life and government. Much of the 
literature on the public sphere originated in discussions inspired by Jurgen Habermas's rather idealized 
account of the sphere's development in Western Europe, as presented in his The Structural Transformation 
o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category o f Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1991). See especially Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1993) ; and Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1992). For a highly critical discussion of the concept in an Islamic context, see Talal Asad, "The Limits of 
Religious Criticism in the Middle East: Notes on Islamic Public Argument," in Asad, Genealogies o f 
Religion: Discipline and Reasons o f Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), pp. 200-236.
9 On the influence of mass education on religious authority in Islam, see Olivier Roy, "The Islamist New 
Intellectuals," in The Failure o f Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1994) , pp. 89-106; and Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, "Print, Islam, and the Prospects for Civic 
Pluralism: New Religious Writings and Their Audiences," Journal o f Islamic Studies 8,1 (1997): 43-62.
10 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.
5; see also, Dale F. Eickelman, "Mass Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab 
Societies," in American Ethnologist 19,4 (November 1992): 643-655. For an Egyptian illustration of mass- 
culture construction, see Walter Armbrust, Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
11 The charge of "fundamentalism" is a recurring theme in R. William Liddle's interesting, but analytically 
unmeasured, polemic against the DDII, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political 
Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia," in Mark R. Woodward, Toward a New Paradigm: Recent 
Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), pp. 323-56. 
Generalizations like "fundamentalist" or "scripturalist" obscure the diverse ideologies and temperaments
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commitment to a particular understanding of Islam, what DDII supporters have in 
common is, first and foremost, allegiance to the memory of Indonesia's largest Muslim 
reformist political party, Masyumi, and to, more particularly, that faction of the party 
associated with its most famous leader, Mohammad Natsir.12 It was under Natsir's 
direction that the DDII was founded in 1967 by Muslim scholars and politicians linked 
to Masyumi.
During Indonesia's brief period of parliamentary democracy (1950-57), Masyumi 
had been the largest of several Islamic parties, and, in the 1955 elections, the second 
largest of the political parties in the nation as a whole. Though in Java (where almost 
two-thirds of Indonesia's population resides) the Nationalist and Communist Parties 
enjoyed a larger following, on Indonesia's outer islands Masyumi was the most 
broadly based political organization. The Masyumi leader, Mohammad Natsir, had 
served as Minister of Information in the republican government and as first Prime 
Minister after independence; his party also played an honorable role in several of the 
country's early coalition governments.13 In the late 1950s, however, as President 
Soekarno stumbled toward heightened collaboration with the Communist Party (in 
part to counterbalance the growing power of the military), Masyumi leaders became 
increasingly critical of the president's authoritarian rule. They shared this view and a 
commitment to constitutional government with the much smaller but intellectually 
influential party of the social-democratic left, the Socialist Party (PSI).
During 1958-1959, military and civilian authorities in several provinces rebelled 
against the central government, demanding a devolution of powers to the provinces 
and limits on Soekarno's power.14 Acting as individuals not party representatives,
of rank-and-file members of organizations like the DDII. The great majority of senior DDII supporters 
align themselves with the organization out of a sense of allegiance to the Natsir faction of Masyumi, which 
they regard as having been constitutionally minded, loyal to the republic, and unfairly persecuted. Many 
of the organization's members are political moderates, though their theological center of gravity tends 
toward a conservative varient of reformism. In deference to Liddle's position, however, it must also be 
acknowledged that the dynamics of reformist politics have changed since the Masyumi era, and, as I note 
later, a faction within the organization has hardened its attitudes on constitutional democracy, religious 
pluralism, and the West. With its shocking caricature of Liddle behind a Star of David, the published 
reaction of some Media Dakzvah writers to Liddle's article (which was published in translation in 
Indonesia) provides one especially unhappy illustration of just such a hardening. See "Menjawab Liddle" 
(To Answer Liddle), Media Dakzvah, No. 230 (August 1993): 41-58.
12 On Natsir's background and career, see Yusril Ihza, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The 
Biography of Mohammad Natsir," Studia Islamika 2,1 (1995): 111-47, and Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan 
Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1970) 
Federspiel notes that, before Masyumi's founding, Natsir had been a leading figure in the theologically 
conservative reformist organization Persatuan Islam (Persis). The uncompromising writing style I 
describe below for Media Dakwah was also a characteristic of Persis. Rather than being identified with the 
Masyumi legacy as a whole, then, the DDII's genealogy may in certain respects owe more to the Persis 
faction in Masyumi.
13 See Herbert Feith, The Decline o f Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1962), pp. 146-176.
14 On the party rivalries and national struggles that formed the background to the rebellions, see Daniel S. 
Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1966), especially pp. 11-132; and Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 
1987), pp. 369-388. For a DDII view of these events, see Lukman Hakiem's biography of Anwar Harjono, 
Perjalanan Mencari Keadilan dan Persatuan (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1993), pp. 203-212.
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several Masyumi leaders, including Natsir, went over to the rebel side.15 Officially the 
party leadership refused to support the rebellion, urging a negotiated settlement; 
however the leadership also rejected Soekamo and the military's demands that they 
condemn the rebellion outright. Sensing an opportunity to strike at two of his most 
effective critics, Soekamo took advantage of the crisis to ban Masyumi and the Socialist 
Party. Months later (in January 1962), as the final remnants of the rebellion were being 
mopped up, the president also imprisoned much of the leadership of the two parties, 
including Natsir. As these two parties had been outspoken proponents of the rule of 
law and democratic proceduralism, the elimination of Masyumi and PSI dealt another 
blow to Indonesian democracy and represented one more step in a continuing shift of 
power from society to the state.16
A few years later, of course, Soekarno himself fell from power, and it looked for a 
while as if Masyumi's political fortunes might be restored. In the aftermath of a failed 
left-wing officers' coup on September 30,1965, Masyumi supporters and other Muslim 
groupings, along with the conservative wing of the nationalist party, joined forces with 
the Indonesian armed forces to undercut Soekamo's power. During late 1965 and early 
1966, this unwieldy alliance also mounted a fierce campaign against the Communist 
Party, liquidating its cadres and eliminating it forever as a serious political force. 
Despite the party's support for this campaign, the imprisoned Masyumi leaders were 
not freed until mid-1966. By late 1966, it was becoming clear that, though the 
government might tolerate the formation of a reformist political party, it was not about 
to allow Masyumi's rehabilitation or allow its leaders opportunities to play prominent 
roles in a new Islamic party. This was but the beginning of a long winter of discontent 
for reformist Muslims faithful to the Masyumi vision. For the next twenty years New 
Order leaders blocked all efforts to reconstitute Masyumi as a national party; only in 
the early 1990s were party leaders invited by the government to rejoin the national 
dialogue, albeit even then on strictly circumscribed terms.
These, then, were the circumstances in which Natsir and other Masyumi leaders 
invited preachers, teachers, and political leaders to meet in February of 1967 in the 
Tanah Abang region of Central Jakarta to discuss the formation of a new Dakwah 
Counsel. The organization was formally launched three months later, on May 9,1967. 
From the beginning, DDII leaders made no attempt to hide their belief that dakwah 
(predication, affirmation of the faith) is a political as well as religious activity, and 
theirs was to be a political and religious organization. In a 1991 interview with a 
Muslim researcher, Natsir recalled his motives for founding the DDII in just such 
terms: "We are no longer conducting dakwah by means of politics, but engaging in 
political activities by means of dakwah. The result will be the same."17 More 
particularly, in the tightly controlled circumstances of the early New Order, the DDII 
leadership hoped that religious predication might create an atmosphere more 
conducive to the realization of Islamic political values. In strong contrast to some of
15 See Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, p. 184.
16 On the changing nature of state-society relations in Indonesia, see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old 
State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal o f Asian Studies 
42 (May 1983): 477-96; and Herbert Feith, The Decline, pp. 578-608.
17 Cited in Ihza, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism," p. 129.
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their theologically liberal rivals, DDII spokespeople insist that, in Islam, the linkage 
between religion and politics must not merely be moral, but direct and systematic.
The idea that religion cannot be separated from politics is, of course, a familiar 
claim in Islamist discourse and can be interpreted in quite different ways, including 
liberal or civil democratic ones.18 In reflecting on its meaning here in Indonesia, it is 
important not to assume that the DDII was merely using religion to promote what 
were otherwise non-religious ends. On the contrary, one of the DDII's primary aims 
was to respond to what they and many other Muslims regarded as a religious calamity 
of enormous proportions.19 The event they had in mind was the movement of large 
numbers of nominally Islamic Javanese into Hinduism, syncretic mysticism, and, most 
significantly, Christianity. In the chaotic aftermath of the killings during 1965-1966, no 
one was certain as to how many nominal Javanese were leaving Islam. However, the 
triumphalist declarations of a few Christian missionaries (many supported by 
American Protestant missions) implied that the movement into Christian ranks was 
massive; a few foreigners spoke dizzily of winning the majority of Javanese to 
Christianity in a twenty year period.20 In historical retrospect, it is clear that, while 
conversion to Christianity increased dramatically in the late 1960s and 1970s— 
involving upwards of one and a half million people (about 1.5 to 2 percent of the 
Indonesian population at that time)—it was nowhere near the scale feared by 
conservative Muslims or forecast by foreign missionaries.21 Under the turbulent 
circumstances of the early New Order, however, it was impossible to gauge this fact 
with confidence. What was clear was that many of the converts came from what had 
been communist strongholds in East and Central Java, a fact that only heightened 
Muslim anxieties as to the potential scale of conversion.
Though secular nationalists were also represented in their ranks, many of the 
converts came from communities ravaged by the anticommunist killings of 1965-1966. 
Between one quarter and one-half million people had died at that time, and another 
two million had been imprisoned.22 Many more lived in the shadow of violence, 
uncertain whether they too might fall victim to another anticommunist onslaught.
18 See, for example, the discussion of competing understandings of this point in John L. Esposito and John 
O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 4-6.
19 It should be noted, however, that Christian efforts to convert Muslims in Indonesia had long been an 
issue of concern to leaders like Natsir, as well as the Persatuan Islam of which he was part. See, for 
example, the essays collected in his Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1969), several of 
which date from the colonial era; see also Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, p. 180.
20- See for example some of the missionary commentaries quoted in Avery T. Willis, The Indonesian Revival 
Why Two Million Came To Christ (Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1977).
21 This is not to deny that, from a Muslim perspective, the conversion was not a significant event. Much of 
the conversion took place in urban areas, and in some of Central Java's largest cities the number of 
Christians grew from 1-2 percent prior to 1965 to more than 10 percent.
22 The two most comprehensive studies of the violence are the collection edited by Robert Cribb entitled 
The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Victoria [Australia]: Monash Papers 
on Southeast Asia, No. 21, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), and, for Bali, 
Geoffrey Robinson's The Dark Side o f Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1995). For an East Java case study of the killings, see my, The Political Economy o f  
Mountain Java: An Interpretive History (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1993), Chapter 
11 .
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Earlier, in the 1950s, a small number of people in the nominally Islamic or "Javanist" 
community had flirted with conversion from Islam to Christianity or Javanese 
mysticism, but none of these initiatives had turned into genuine mass movements.23 In 
the aftermath of 1965-1966, however, pressures increased on all citizens to profess an 
officially sanctioned religion, and Javanese mysticism was not among the options 
allowed. Stung by the political violence and convinced that Muslim organizations had 
sanctioned the killings, a few Javanists now seemed prepared to renounce Islam 
altogether.
This threat of large-scale diversion from Islam was one of the key issues to which 
the DDII sought to respond. As a reformist organization that had inherited an 
educated and disciplined cadre from Masyumi, the DDII hoped to bring to the 
challenge educational and "scientific" skills lacking in other dakwah organizations. The 
DDII's leadership identified four tasks as critical to its endeavor: 1) the training of 
skilled preachers; 2) the publication of the written materials required for a more 
effective and ideologically informed predication; 3) the deployment of dakwah 
preachers to regions identified as vulnerable to non-Islamic proselytization (especially 
Christian); and 4) analysis of the cultural and organizational requisites of dakwah 
consolidation in regions visited by predication teams.
In focusing on these goals, the DDII sought to distinguish its specializations from 
existing dakwah organizations, such as, most notably, the fifty-year old grande dame of 
modernist organizations, Muhammadiyah. Though some DDII leaders were also 
members of that organization, historically the Muhammadiyah had sought to 
emphasize educational and social-welfare programs, downplaying—though never 
entirely ignoring—direct political action.24 By contrast with Muhammadiyah, the 
DDII's founders were openly and incessantly preoccupied with governmental policies 
that affected the Muslim community. In other words, the DDII's chosen specialization 
in the dakwah field was religious politics, concerned with matters ranging from national 
religious policy to local officials' attitudes toward predication. In this sense the DDII 
perpetuated the politicized understanding of predication developed by Masyumi 
during the heated struggles of the 1950s, when religious education had been drawn 
into the campaign against communists and secular nationalists. In a 1978 interview, 
Mohammad Natsir likened the DDII to a little electrical generator located behind and 
beneath a house, so that its noise could not be heard even as it lights up the whole 
house.25 This was not a predication for private piety alone.
23 For examples of diversion from Islam, see Clifford Geertz's "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese 
Example/' in Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 242-69, and my 
discussion of Javanese Buddha-Visnu Religion, in "The Political Economy of Islamic Conversion in 
Modem East Java," in William R. Roff, ed., Islam and the Political Economy o f Meaning: Comparative Studies o f  
Muslim Discourse (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 53-78.
24 See M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, "Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in 
Indonesia's New Order," PhD Dissertation, Program in Islamic Studies, University of California Los 
Angeles, 1991.
25 Cited in Lukman Hakiem's brief but illuminating history of the Dewan Dakwah, "Tiga Windu Dewan 
Dakwah, Mesin Diesel yang Menghidupkan" [A Quarter Centry of Dewan Dakwah, A Diesel That Brings 
to Life], in Media Dakwah (March 1991): 33-40.
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The DDII's interest in extending dakwah to regions vulnerable to non-Muslim 
predication was consistent with this consciously political vision of religious education. 
Among other things, it also meant that the DDII chose (and still today chooses) to work 
in regions where it goes head to head with Christian missionaries.26 Though 
traditionalist and modernist Muslims alike were disturbed in the 1960s by the scale of 
Christian missionizing, it is the DDII more than any other organization that has 
brought Christian activities into the media spotlight, condemning them again and 
again in the harshest of terms. DDII ire is fueled by their belief that conversion 
undermines prospects for a more thorough Islamization of Indonesian politics. (An 
Islamization that, unlike the 1950s' Masyumi, the DDII insists is not the same as the 
establishment of an Islamic State, a demand that would run afoul of New Order 
policies). Equally important, their ire reflects their conviction that in the late 1960s and 
1970s some national leaders encouraged diversion from Islam with the express intent 
of weakening mass support for political Islam. Muslims of more moderate persuasion, 
such as renewalist Muslims (see below) and cosmopolitan members of the 
metropolitan middle class, often feel uncomfortable with the DDII's fierce diatribes 
against Kristenisasi (Christianization). Some members of the military have told me that 
they regard DDII statements as violating government policies on religious pluralism. 
However, even in the late 1970s, it was already clear that DDII efforts to keep the issue 
of Christianization in public view were having an impact, influencing new government 
restrictions on Christian evangelism.27
A second difference between the DDII and existing dakwah organizations was that 
the DDII sought ties with Muslim organizations outside Indonesia and placed greater 
emphasis on internationalist issues in its dakwah. This internationalist orientation has 
long been characteristic of Masyumi leaders, but it has become especially pronounced 
under the DDII. In part this reflects the fact that the DDII became operational in the
26 Indeed, one of the most significant changes in dakwah promoted by the DDII in recent years has been its 
establishment of predication programs in regions from which Muslim preachers have historically 
absented themselves. For example, in 1990 the DDII sent preachers into the Tengger highlands in East Java 
and sponsored the construction of a mosque. The highlands are a predominantly Hindu region where I 
had done research in the late 1970s and 1985. According to the DDII preachers I interviewed in 1991, ABRI 
officials in Surabaya had been furious upon learning of this initiative and sought to have the Muslim 
missionaries expelled on the grounds that the Tengger highlands is officially Hindu. However, in a move 
reflecting the efforts of higher ranking officials to improve relations with Muslims, their protests were 
ignored. Similarly, in 1995 and 1996, the DDII began a predication campaign in Nusatenggara Timor, a 
portion of eastern Indonesia regarded by some Christians as historically Christian and also off-limits, 
therefore, to Muslim predication. Christian leaders with whom I spoke were upset by this action, 
regarding it as a violation of government religious policy; DDII officials counter that there is a Muslim 
population in the region and they have religious rights too. Finally, since 1995, preachers (some DDII- 
linked, some independent) have begun work in the Yogyakarta region in villages where Christian 
conversion occurred after 1965-1966. They are determined to check any further Christian advance, and, if 
possible, reverse what has already occurred.
27 On the restrictions imposed on Christian Missions in 1978-1979, see M. Bambang Pranowo, "Which 
Islam and Which Pancasila? Islam and the State in Indonesia: A Comment," in Arief Budiman, ed., State 
and Society in Indonesia (Clayton [Australia]: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 22, Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 493. For a discussion of the far-reaching impact of this and 
other government policies on Christian-Muslim relations in rural Java, see Hyung-Jun Kim, "Reformist 
Muslims in a Yogyakarta Village," PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1996.
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aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and just prior to the oil boom of 1973. Both 
developments led to an increase in international assistance from Muslim countries, 
especially from theologically conservative agencies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, 
and Egypt. The DDII has established institutional and educational ties with 
organizations in all of these countries, and its media organ, Media Dakwah, features 
commentaries on social and intellectual developments in these countries as well. In this 
and other ways, Media Dakwah serves as a broker for Middle Eastern Muslim ideas, 
including harsh critiques of secularism, exposes of alleged Zionist conspiracies, and 
conservative writings on the role of women in Islam. Indonesian translations of foreign 
writings of this sort are a notable feature of Islamic publishing under the New Order, 
in striking contrast to the relative paucity of Middle Eastern political literature prior to 
1966.28
From the DDII's perspective, the conjuncture of these developments—the timing of 
its own founding and the growing commitment of Middle Eastern agencies to 
international assistance—was serendipitous. In the 1970s and 1980s, DDII officials 
were unhappy with the content of instruction in Indonesian religious schools. Though 
they welcomed the government's policy mandating religious instruction from grade 
school to university, they were worried by what they regarded as a liberal bias in the 
system of Islamic Teacher Training Colleges (IAIN) and, to a less consistent degree, in 
the Department of Religion as a whole. On several occasions in recent years, DDII 
officials have remarked to me that they regretted that the government in the 1980s sent 
so many promising young scholars to universities in the United States and Western 
Europe rather than the Middle East, even for advanced training in Islamic Studies. 
Their suspicions seemed confirmed when some among those young scholars returned 
home preaching variants of Fazlurian neomodernism and Mu'tazilah rationalism— 
tolerant, pluralistic schools of Islamic interpretation to which theological conservatives 
object. Even worse from the perspective of the DDII, some of these individuals went on 
to receive important appointments in the Department of Religion.29
In the face of these developments, the DDII sought to take advantage of Masyumi's 
internationalist reputation and solicit scholarships for study at more conservative 
centers of learning in the Middle East; they have also received funds for domestic 
educational programs. Through initiatives like this, the DDII has sent hundreds of 
students to centers of learning in the Middle East. In so doing, the organization has 
helped to maintain a cadre of intellectuals committed to an internationalist, and 
decidedly anti-liberal, version of reformist Islam, one closer in its idioms and spirit to 
the Middle Eastern Islamic brotherhoods.
28 See Jeroen Peeters, "Prophets and Profits: The Internal Structure of the Islamic Book Industry in 
Indonesia." Paper presented at the conference on "Mass Media and the Transformation of Islamic 
Discourse," International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, March 24,1997.
29 A regular focus of DDII criticism, the most distinguished spokesperson for a moderately Mu'tazilah 
rationalism has been Harun Nasution, former rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies of Syarif 
Hidayatullah, Jakarta. See Saiful Muzani, "Mu'tazilah Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian 
Muslim Community: Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution," in Studia Islamika 1,1 (1994): 91-131.
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The Politics of Media
No where is the DDII's political and internationalist consciousness more apparent 
than in its official publication, Media Dakwah.30 Originally Media Dakwah was not a 
monthly magazine, as it is today, but an intermittent series of stenciled offprints 
produced for limited distribution among DDII preachers and supporters. During its 
first years, the publication was used to circulate speeches and policy statements from 
Mohammad Natsir and other DDII leaders. Media Dakwah was prohibited from 
circulating materials to the general public because it lacked the permits required for 
mass distribution. Weakened by the ban on Masyumi and barred from mainstream 
media, the DDII relied on these inexpensive offprints for its ideological lifeblood. The 
dissemination of its materials was limited, however, to the predominantly urban 
network of activists, preachers, and lower-middle class business people on which the 
DDII was based.
The DDII's media problems took a turn for the worse in 1974. In January of that 
year, there were street battles in the capital on the occasion of a visit by the Japanese 
prime minister to the capital. The visit came after several months of press and public 
debate on foreign investment, and allegations of illegal payments from Japanese 
investors to high-ranking government officials. Later reports on this protest, known 
today as the "Malari" Incident, suggest that high-ranking members of the military 
unhappy with the government's economic policies advised the protesters, and may 
have provided logistical support.31 However, official accounts of the incident placed 
full blame for the violence on what were claimed to be underground elements of 
Masyumi and the PSI. Even worse as far as DDII Muslims were concerned, the 
government took advantage of the incident to crack down on the national press, 
banning a number of newspapers, including Harian Abadi, a daily linked to the former 
Masyumi. No Muslim daily ever emerged to take the place of Harian Abadi as a 
national voice for Masyumi Muslims.
Today reporters and staff at Media Dakwah insist that this crack-down was all part 
of a deliberate campaign against the Muslim media and, in particular, Masyumi 
supporters. This view is shared even by Muslims otherwise unsympathetic to Media 
Dakwah, though these commentators add that activists of a secular democratic 
persuasion suffered as well. These critics point their finger at then-security chief Ali 
Moertopo, who was known to work closely with advisors from the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), a think-tank supported by well-connected Sino- 
Indonesians and regarded by most Masyumi-inclined Muslims as hostile to their 
interests.32 Whatever the precise course of events, it is clear that, after the banning of 
Harian Abadi, the Muslim community had no independent mass-circulation daily.
30 What follows is based on interviews with Anwar Harjono (DDII head), June 14,1995; Lukman Hakiem 
and Aru Syeif Asad (Media Dakwah reporters), January 7,1977; Natsir Zubaidi, January 10,1997; and 
general interviews with Muslim intellectuals, as well as general reading in Media Dakwah.
31 See John Bresnan's summary account of Malari, in Managing Indonesia• The Modern Political Economy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 135-63.
32 On the CSIS, see David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca: 
Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1984), pp. 20-32.
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Making the DDII's marginalization all the more bitter was the fact that the mid-to- 
late-1970s were years of sustained media expansion, with increasing sales of 
newspapers and newsweeklies to a small but growing urban middle class. 
Remarkably, some of the most successful print media to flourish at this time were 
either nonconfessional or Christian-owned. The influential Tempo, Indonesia's most 
widely respected newsweekly (banned by the government in 1994), is illustrative of 
these developments. Tempo was owned and operated by a predominantly Muslim- 
Indonesian staff. But its editorial line was unabashedly independent and 
nonconfessional, consistent with the brightly cosmopolitan and pluralist tastes of its 
staff and elite readership. During these same years, the Catholic owned Kompas- 
Gramedia group also began its ascent to a position of unquestioned dominance in the 
newsprint and publishing industry. Today this media group dominates the Indonesian 
publishing industry, owning all or part of some twenty-three magazines and six 
newspapers, as well as Indonesia's largest publishing house. This is a remarkable 
achievement for a Catholic-owned conglomerate in a majority-Muslim nation, and a 
source of pride for some Indonesians, who view it as evidence of their country's 
religious tolerance. Against the memory of their own marginalization, however, DDII 
Muslims view Kompas-Gramedia's success with deep resentment, regarding the 
conglomerate's rise as one more sign of a secularist conspiracy against Muslim 
media.33
Editors associated with Tempo and Kompas insist that their publishing success was 
the result not of government engineering, but of their own skill at responding to the 
changing tastes of the emerging middle class.34 There can be little doubt that these 
publishers have demonstrated a genius for combining quality reporting with brilliant 
marketing. The best of their media easily match the finest American mass-publications 
for their seriousness and breadth of coverage. (Though the media group of which 
Kompas is part also publishes sensationalist tabloids.) In their editors' view, one 
additional key to their success has been their decision to downplay religious affiliation 
and invite gifted Muslim liberals to write for their publications. Not surprisingly, 
however, DDII authors and other anti-liberals are rarely among those invited.
Though DDII reporters and activists place most of the blame for their 
marginalization on anti-Masyumi figures in government, others acknowledge that 
there were commercial reasons for their press difficulties as well. In January 1997, a 
prominent reporter who once wrote for Media Dakwah and now works in an important 
government office told me that the greatest obstacle to the success of Islamic 
newspapers today is no longer government policy but the fact that advertisers shy
33 On the rise of media conglomerates under the New Order, see David T. Hill's excellent, The Press in New 
Order Indonesia (Nedlands [Australia]: Asia Paper 4, University of Western Australia Press, 1994), pp. 81- 
110. A detailed presentation of Media Dakwah views on the Catholic-owned Kompas-Gramedia group is 
presented in the magazine's report on the Monitor affair. In that incident, the most commercially 
successful of the group's editors was tried and imprisoned for having allowed his magazine to publish a 
readers poll in which the Prophet Muhammad was ranked low among public figures popular in 
Indonesia. See "Membedah Jantung Monitor" (To Operate on the Heart of Monitor), Media Dakwah 
(December 1990):
25-30.
34 Interview with Kompas Associate Editor S. T. Soelarto, January 11,1997, and former Tempo reporters, 
January 1997 and June 1995.
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away from the Islamic press. Like other Media Dakwah associates, he feels that security 
officials sought to muzzle the Islamic press in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, 
since the late 1980s, he says, the door has again opened for Islamic media. However, 
fiscal requirements still present serious hurdles to any such effort. Among other things, 
he claimed, the Department of Information requires a large payment ($140,000, he 
asserted) from anyone requesting a mass circulation (SIUPP) permit. It has only been 
since the late-1980s that open expression of Islamic piety has become fashionable 
among members of the Indonesian business and professional class. And it has only 
been since this period that a few advertisers have been willing to invest funds in 
Islamic weeklies. However, the majority of large Indonesian businesses remain Sino- 
Indonesian, and many are still reluctant to support Muslim publications.
In the face of all these obstacles, and because after 1974 Masyumi and the DDII 
lacked a national newspaper, the heretofore limited-purpose Media Dakwah assumed a 
heavier media burden in the late 1970s. In 1976, under the leadership of the respected 
(and, among DDII figures, politically moderate) leader Muhammad Roem, the 
publication changed its format from an intermittent offprint to a monthly 
newsmagazine of DDII affairs. Still published on inexpensive newsprint, it evolved 
over the next four years into its present newsmagazine format, which includes 
newsprint-quality photos and occasional glossy inserts. Media Dakwah's format was 
also standardized at this time. It was divided into sections, with a primary section on 
national news, especially as relates to the Muslim community; another on news from 
around the Muslim world; a multi-page feature report on some aspect of Indonesian 
politics; and a few columns and regular features. Feature sections include a full-page 
verse from the Qur'an, always placed at the front of the magazine; an introductory 
essay by the DDII head (Anwar Harjono at the time of this writing), usually relating 
some issue of timely importance to a lesson from the Qur'an; commentaries on 
Qur'anic interpretation; readers' letters; and, very important, a selection of short 
reports on dakwah activities from around the country. Though not monthly features, 
fierce exposes of "Christianization" and biting analyses of moral decline are among the 
topics most consistently featured in news reports.
Like Muslim media in many parts of the world, Media Dakwah blends moral and 
religious language directly into its reporting, so that reports on current events 
invariably return to basic themes from the Qur'an and Islamic history. What 
distinguishes the magazine among Indonesian Muslim publications is that it presents 
its appeals in a language that is accessible, philosophically unnuanced, and virulently 
uncompromising.35 Stylistically speaking, the language of Media Dakwah is what might 
be called militantly middle-browist. Though the magazine does publish articles of a
35 These traits were also characteristic of Persis publications during the 1930s, some of which were 
authored by Mohammad Natsir. Describing the style of writing in that organization's publications, 
Howard Federspiel observes, "Clarity was achieved by simple sentences, by defining all religious terms 
used in the discussion, and by avoiding time-consuming lateral problems." Later in the book, Federspiel 
adds tellingly that, "Persis writing . . .  offered no quarter and accepted no compromise, but demanded
complete submission-----A genuine Islamic sense of catholicity, of acceptance of disagreement, was
lacking among Persis ulama, nor could they envisage a society where the opposition would have the right 
to disagree for all time. There was, at best, tolerance for only a limited period, since Persis members were 
convinced that finally all other viewpoints would inevitably conform with their own. This was Islam as 
ideology rather than religion." See Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, pp. 24,192.
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serious and specialized nature, the editors encourage writers to keep their prose clear, 
unembellished, and focused on essentials. Muslim critics of the magazine often refer to 
its writing as "dry" (Jeering) and "harsh" (keras), and dismiss it as lowbrow and 
inflammatory. The magazine has none of the introspective, reflexively critical essays 
regularly featured, for example, in Ulumul Qur'an, Indonesia's most respected liberal 
journal (of a loosely neomodernist persuasion). Also absent are the latter journal's 
wide-ranging and engagingly pluralistic dialogues on non-Islamic religion, Western 
and Islamic philosophy, feminism, the idea of the Islamic state, and human rights— 
symposia that have earned Ulumul Qur'an a reputation as one of the most 
courageously experimental journals in the Muslim world.
Media Dakwah has one other distinctive trait. Unlike the two publications associated 
with the Association of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI), Republika and Ummat, 
the magazine makes no attempt to represent the broad range of opinion within the 
Muslim community as a whole. Alternately ignoring or condemning its Muslim rivals, 
the magazine presents a unitary and totalizing ideological face. Those deviating too 
much from a proper Islamic line are portrayed as hypocrites and unbelievers. Fearing 
pluralism only promotes error, the magazine's editorials are infused with a single- 
minded ideological fervor that, more than any other print medium in contemporary 
Indonesia, harks back to the politicized journalism of the late Soekarno era. 
Throughout all, Media Dakwah's message is adamantly anti-humanist and anti-liberal. 
Disdainful of speculative philosophy and the religious ecumenicism advocated by 
some Muslim writers, it emphasizes the uncompromising truth of Islam, Islam's 
superiority to all other religions, and the threats posed to Muslims in a world 
dominated by anti-Islamic powers.
Media Dakwah also engages in none of the reporting on film stars and media 
celebrities found in the more mainstream Muslim media, such as Republika or the now 
popular Muslim weekly Ummat. Celebrity-reporting in the latter publications has been 
a consistent source of irritation to DDII officials, who feel that it exacerbates the moral 
confusion rampant in Indonesian society.
Editors at Republika and Ummat counter these criticisms by emphasizing that their 
publications are intended not just for political stalwarts or the deeply pious, but for 
individuals who are still uncertain in their faith and uncomfortable with moral 
stridency. These editors see their mission in Indonesian society in terms quite different 
from those of Media Dakwah. In a country still haunted by memories of religious 
trauma, they say, their charge is to reassure citizens that Islam is modem, tolerant, and 
in tune with modern concerns. As one of Republika's editors observed in January 1997, 
"The people at Media Dakwah believe that if something is not approved in the Qur'an 
or Sunnah it is forbidden. But why should this be so? God made us with minds to 
inquire and explore. We feel that if something is not explicitly forbidden then it is 
acceptable to explore it." Thus Republika and Ummat feature regular stories on the arts, 
television, literature, and fashion trends of interest to the middle- and upper-middle 
class Muslims who comprise their readership.
At one level, Media Dakwah journalists are well aware that they write for a different 
reader than magazines like Ummat. When in January of 19971 asked Lukman Hakiem, 
probably the most gifted of Media Dakwah's writers (and someone charged with 
writing some of the magazine's most mordant editorials), whether the magazine felt
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threatened by the appearance of such new Muslim news weeklies as Ummat, he 
surprised me with his answer:
No, I'm not worried. We're not really in competition with magazines like that. Our 
readership is different. Ummat is for the urban middle class and above. We [at 
Media Dakwah] focus more on "semi-urban" [he uses the English term] Muslims. 
Many of our readers are Muslim preachers and teachers in kampung and semi- 
urban areas of Indonesia.
What surprised me about this answer was that it appealed, not to high-flying 
ideological principles, but to a level-headed sociological assessment of market 
segments. Based on my own samples of readers in Jakarta and East Java, Lukman's 
observation is quite accurate. The typical Media Dakwah reader resides in or just outside 
a city, comes from the ranks of the educated lower-middle class or working poor, and 
has developed an interest in the magazine as a result of a personal identification with 
Masyumi or participation in DDII predication. Though Media Dakwah has some 
affluent and well-educated readers, including some from the ranks of student activists, 
its average reader is from a lower educational and income background than the 
readers of Ummat or the theologically liberal Ulumul Qur'an. The activist and lower- 
class background of much of Media Dakwah's readership works to reinforce its editors' 
unease with the fashionable concerns of the middle- and upper-middle class.
There are other, equally practical reasons for Media Dakwah's reporting emphasis. 
Under the terms of Indonesia's strict press licensing regulations, the magazine does not 
qualify for a "general publishing license" or SIUPP.36 It controls only a Surat Tanda 
Terdaftar (STT), or "Letter of Registration." While a STT permit is inexpensive and 
easier to obtain, the lack of a SIUPP severely limits a publication's access to the reading 
public. Some of the restrictions appear petty: a magazine with an STT, for example, 
cannot refer to its chief manager as an "editor" or its journalists as "reporters." More 
seriously, a magazine with an STT is not allowed to distribute its product for general 
sale, but must confine its circulation to "limited circles," such as the members of an 
organization. Though in recent years Media Dakwah has been allowed to distribute to 
some bookstores and kiosks, it is still not widely available. Similarly, without a SIUPP, 
only 10 percent of a publication's pages can be dedicated to advertisements, a 
restriction that limits a publication's ability to generate revenues for expansion.
Despite these hurdles, Media Dakwah has managed to increase its readership and 
consolidate its operations, especially since the Islamic revival of the late 1980s and the 
relaxation of tensions with the government. Today, a typical press run is a respectable 
sixteen to eighteen thousand copies, with especially popular issues (such as the 
January 1997 story criticizing Republika) selling as many as twenty-five thousand. 
Equally important, since 1991 the magazine has become financially self-sustaining, no 
longer requiring subsidies from the DDII. (Indirectly, however, it still receives building 
subsidies since it is housed at the headquarters of the DDII on Jl. Kramat Raya 45 in 
central Jakarta, in what used to be Masyumi's national headquarters.) It has a full-time 
editorial staff of five reporters and a business team of another five. It out-sources its
36- Before 1982, the SIUPP was known as a SIT, Surat Izin Terbit or "Permit to Publish." On the regulations 
surrounding SIUPP ownership, see Hill, The Press, pp. 47-51.
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printing. The magazine also relies on a network of freelance journalists, paid on a per- 
article basis.
Despite Media Dakwah's success in establishing a niche for itself in the Muslim 
reading public, its staff members speak bitterly of the still-limited reach of Muslim 
media in Indonesia. They point out that, of Indonesia's many Muslim organizations, 
only one, the mainstream Muhammadiyah, controls a general publishing permit 
(SIUPP).37 They deeply resent that some of the largest publishing groups in Indonesia 
are Christian-owned, and are convinced that this results in an anti-Islamic bias in 
reporting.
For all these reasons, Media Dakwah and the DDII leadership welcomed the news 
that, in January of 1991, a new Muslim daily, Republika, was to be launched. They knew 
that the newspaper was to be the official organ of ICMI, the Association of Indonesian 
Islamic Intellectuals. They were also aware of ideological tensions within that 
government-sponsored organization. However, from its start, Republika was officially 
identified as a publication that would serve the interests of the entire Muslim 
community. In an effort to underscore that relationship, the foundation that manages 
Republika, the Yayasan Abdi Bangsa, sold shares in the paper to the whole Muslim 
community.38 In a political context as unsettled as late New Order Indonesia, however, 
Republika's pledge to represent the entire ummat—and, by implication, to respond to 
the concerns of the DDII—would prove a difficult charge indeed.
A Clash of Cultures
Against this historical background, we can begin to understand the disagreement 
that pitted Media Dakwah supporters against the Republika staff. Two demonstrations by 
the DDII-led alliance illustrate some of these tensions.
The first incident took place on April 17,1995. The immediate provocation for the 
action was Republika's publication of a special "Friday Report," about which I will say 
more below. The protesters framed their grievances, however, in a way that 
highlighted broader differences of philosophy and political vision. For example, the 
protesters' letter of concern emphasized that, because a significant portion of 
Republika's operating capital had been accumulated through the sale of stock shares to 
the broader Muslim community, the newspaper "represents a strategic asset of the 
Islamic community" and, therefore, "cannot be freed from its responsibility to the 
entire Islamic community {ummat)." The statement went on to list what it described as 
"oddities" (keanehan) in the newspaper's coverage of religious and national issues. 
These included the newspaper's reporting on art performances "that are very un- 
Islamic"; its periodic stories on Shi'i social and political thought (this in a country, one 
of the demonstrators commented,39 where there is no significant Shi'i population); and,
37 Muhammadhiyah has two SIUPP, one for its general magazine and the other for its women's 
magazine. Neither has achieved a mass-circulation standing.
38 See Hill, The Press, p. 128.
39 Interviews with protest leaders and Republika staff were conducted between December 29,1996, and 
January 12,1997.1 had also interviewed protagonists from both sides of this conflict during June-July 1995, 
and during July of 1993. It is a well-known secret that one of Republika’s editors has a sympathetic interest 
in Shi'i social and political ideas; the Media Dakwah criticism was clearly directed at this man.
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most generally, the newspaper's "tendency to show a cosm opolitan  attitude, placing 
anything and everything in the newspaper without bothering to ask whether that news 
would have a positive or negative impact on the Muslim community" (emphasis 
added).40
The last statement was illustrative of a deeper difference between Republika and 
Media Dakwah. As noted above, Media Dakwah emerged in a context of political trauma, 
haunted by the imprisonment of Masyumi leaders, the suppression of Masyumi's 
newspaper, and the Masyumi community's political marginalization.41 Under these 
circumstances, the DDII survived by shifting away from the give-and-take of public 
politics, from which it was in any case barred, to an austere program of religious 
predication and grass-roots struggle, especially among the disenfranchised of urban 
and semi-urban Indonesia. The strategy, again, was that described by Mohammad 
Natsir: to engage and maintain the little electrical generator hidden behind and 
beneath the house.
Inevitably, the deployment of this strategy had an impact on the public vision of 
the DDII. In the early 1950s, when it was seen as one of Indonesia's most respected and 
honest political parties, Masyumi was a complex and evolving alliance between, on 
one hand, Muslim constitutionalists, committed to a procedural democracy and the 
rule of law (grounded, of course, on Islamic ethical principles), and, to borrow 
Marshall Hodgson's phrase, “shariah-minded" Islamists, more concerned with the 
purity of the Islamic message than in experimenting with constitutional politics. As 
Allan A. Samson observed in his 1972 dissertation, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia,"42 
the events of the late Soekarno-era and early New Order weakened the influence of 
constitutionalists in the organizations that survived Masyumi's demise. In the eyes of 
their conservative rivals, the proceduralists' commitment to democratic institutions 
had failed to produce worthwhile returns. Samson interpreted the subsequent 
hardening of attitudes among ex-Masyumi supporters as the result of a shift in the 
community's center-of-power from democratic proceduralists to shariah-minded 
Islamists. Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia with whom I have spoken don't disagree
40 The demonstrators' letter of protest and a longer cover story on anti -Republika grievances were 
published simultaneously in Media Dakwah. See the "Special Report" (Laporan Khusus), "Republika 
Menentang Arus Umat?" (Republika Opposes the Muslim Community's Current?), Media Dakwah, No. 271 
(January 1997): 16-21.
41 Mention was made earlier of the so-called Malari incident of January 1974, blamed in official statements 
on Masyumi and socialist leaders. However, there were numerous incidents of force against Masyumi and 
associated reformists in later years. Perhaps the most notorious occurred in the aftermath of the Tanjung 
Priok violence of late 1984, in which dozens of Muslim protestors (including preachers with spiritual ties 
to the DDII) were killed during a confrontation with authorities. The incident was followed by several 
months of arson and bombings, which prosecutors sought to link to opponents of the New Order. Among 
those subsequently tried and convicted was a charismatic preacher well-liked in DDII circles, A.M. Fatwa. 
Fatwa was a decent, moderate man who had worked for several years as an advisor to the Jakarta 
governor Ali Sadikin; his imprisonment was seen by many observers as a none-to-subtle warning to the 
DDII leadership. Conversely, many Indonesians saw Fatwa's early release in 1991 as an indication of the 
government's desire to right its relationship with the Muslim community in general, and the DDII in 
particular. On the circumstances of Fatwa's imprisonment, see n.a., Indonesian Muslims on Trial (London: 
TAPOL, 1987).
42 Allan Arnold Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," PhD Dissertation, Department of Political 
Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1972.
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with this analysis, but add, I believe correctly, that the change wasn't just a matter of a 
shift in the neo-Masyumi community's internal balance of power It also represented an 
effort on the part of a leadership stripped of its organization—and thereby freed of the 
obligation to engage in the give-and-take of compromise—to assert what it viewed as 
most essential in its religio-political project. If all else were lost, if they had to abandon 
all hope of building an Islamic democracy, there could still be no compromise on these 
principles. National and international circumstances converged, however, to insure 
that the interpretation of just what those principles were would take a notably more 
conservative tack than had characterized Masyumi thought a few years earlier. 
Political marginalization reinforced ideological essentialization.
There were two especially significant influences on the DDII's evolution, the first 
international, the second domestic. As noted above, Masyumi's leadership had always 
been committed to an internationalist understanding of Islam. Its news media had 
devoted more attention to the larger Muslim world than other Indonesian Muslim 
media. Yet the world to which Masyumi and the DDII were linked underwent 
profound changes in the 1960s and the 1970s. One aspect of this change was a 
hardening of attitudes in international reformist circles toward the United States. 
Unlike the European powers, the United States had not had a colonial presence in the 
Muslim world, and reformists in Indonesia and elsewhere had earlier had a neutral or 
even sympathetic regard for American democracy. Over the years since Masyumi's 
abolition and the DDII's marginalization, however, the image of the United States in 
the Muslim world underwent a profound change. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the 
United States came to be identified with the bitter and humiliating occupation of 
Muslim lands. At the same time, the image of the United States disseminated in 
American popular media changed. To put the matter a bit simplistically, if before the 
United States was portrayed as the land of cowboys and scientists, both of whom 
excited a grudging admiration, by the late 1970s these icons had been displaced by 
troubling images of pornography, violence, drugs, and, in general, moral 
permissiveness. Complicating the matter in Indonesia was the fact that the 1980s saw 
the near-total collapse of the domestic film industry, and its replacement with 
American (and other foreign) action films and sexual dramas. Less visible but equally 
dramatic has been the illegal but widespread importation of European and American 
pornography, an event that has made hard-core sadomasochistic pornography 
available even in remote corners of the archipelago. These and other events—the 
expansion of tourism, alcohol and drug abuse, AIDs, and the growth of the Southeast 
Asian sex industry—left ordinary Muslims deeply confused about the moral values for 
which the United States stood. Some became convinced that the greatest threat from 
the West was less directly political than it was a pernicious subversion of popular 
morality.
The second influence on Masyumi-DDII's evolution, a domestic one, had to do 
with the organization's social and class base. In the 1950s, Masyumi had a brightly 
urban orientation, one consistent with the upbeat middle-class profile of its leadership 
and economic donors. However, for reasons too complex to detail here, the 1950s and 
1960s laid waste to the wealth of the Muslim merchants and small-scale industrialists 
who had provided the funds on which Masyumi depended. The economic collapse of
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these "old santri" only added to the DDII's difficulties in maintaining a social base.43 
As we have seen, the organization gradually moved down market in its programs and 
appeals. Though it continued to look to old santri for much of its financial support, the 
continuing decline of the santri business class forced the DDII to turn to the poor and 
lower-middle-class of urban Indonesia for its support. By contrast, the "new santri" 
middle class that began to emerge in the late 1990s was concentrated not in 
independent enterprise, but in domains such as state education, bureaucracy, and 
government-dependent business. Though many in the new santri middle class were 
drawn to the Islamic revival, they were wary of articulating their religious convictions 
in terms that might jeopardize their ties with government.
Herein lies an additional clue to the DDII's objections to Republika's press coverage. 
Hardened by political persecution, driven to emphasize bare-boned essentials, and 
pushed toward a poorer and less educated social base, the DDII came to emphasize not 
merely the shariah-mindedness of ex-Masyumi conservatives, but the strict, 
ungarnished, and anticosmopolitan Islamism of the urban poor and lumpen-middle 
class.
This social pilgrimage differed greatly from that through which the Republika staff 
and their readers have passed. Republika is the media offspring of the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals or ICMI. As I have described elsewhere,44 ICMI's 
creation was the result of a complex convergence of social forces. Among them were 
the rapid growth of an educated and affluent new middle class; an Islamic revival of 
historically unprecedented proportions; and, in the late 1980s, President Soeharto's 
interest in courting a new base of support beyond that of the armed forces. ICMI's 
internal organization has expressed these ambiguous influences. On one hand, its 
leadership is dominated by government officials loyal to the Minister of Technology, 
B. J. Habibie, one of the president's closest advisors. Their charge was to win the 
support of non-governmental Muslims, while insuring that rank and file members did 
not overstep the bounds of what was in fact a highly-circumscribed "opening."
At the same time, however, ICMI has provided an institutional umbrella that 
allows non-governmental Muslims to sponsor activities and debates unimaginable a 
few years earlier. In its first months, some Western commentators dismissed ICMI as 
no more than an instrument of presidential power. ICMI would not have come into 
existence, of course, had the president not seen its establishment as in his interest. In 
addition, it is clear that the president's willingness to support the organization was 
enhanced by his confidence that Minister Habibie could control independent-minded
43 On the politics and economics of the Muslim middle class, see Aswab Mahasin, "The Santri Middle 
Class: An Insider's View," in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds., The Politics o f  Middle Class Indonesia 
(Clayton [Australia]: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), pp. 138-144; and Robert 
W. Hefner, "Markets and Justice for Muslim Indonesians," in Hefner, ed., Market Cultures: Society and 
Morality in the New Asian Capitalisms (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 237-72. On the changing nature of the 
Indonesian middle class generally, see Howard W. Dick, "The Rise of a Middle Class and the Changing 
Concept of Equity in Indonesia—An Interpretation," Indonesia 39 (1985): 71-92.
441 Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, Class, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle 
Class," Indonesia 56 (October 1993): 1-35. See also M. Syafi'i Anwar's excellent overview of ICMI and 
religious politics, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde 
Baru (The Thought and Action of Indonesian Islam: A Political Analysis of Muslim Intellectuals Under the 
New Order) (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995).
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members of the organization. But a minority within ICMI has continued to struggle to 
carve out a sphere for independent action. Quietly but persistently, they have tried to 
promote what they regard as democratic interests, sponsoring colloquia on human 
rights, publishing articles on the rule of law, and encouraging public discussions of 
Islam, pluralism, and social justice.
Over the years since the organization's founding, the space for independent 
activity within ICMI has diminished, and many Muslim political reformers who once 
supported the organization have grown disillusioned.45 The disillusionment has been 
all the greater inasmuch as many people now believe that the political opening 
trumpeted in the early 1990s has, at least for the moment, closed. The banning of three 
of Indonesia's most respected newsweeklies in 1994,46 the campaign against the 
Muslim democrat Sri Bintang Pamungkas (a founding member of ICMI) in 1995, and 
the clumsy ouster of Megawati Soekarnoputri in 1996 shocked those who hoped that 
the New Order was gradually relaxing its hold on public life. Corruption scandals in 
the nation's supreme court, a crackdown on a fledgling independent labor movement, 
and stricter controls on non-governmental organizations have only added to this 
growing despair 47
Though all this may be true, the fact remains that the government's opening to 
reformist Islam, however controlled, has given some in the reformist community a 
platform from which they and their colleagues had long been barred. After an almost 
twenty-year absence, the government's awarding of a General Publication License 
(SIUPP) to Republika was welcomed even by those who understood that the newspaper 
would be subjected to intense political pressures. It has been so pressured, indeed 
repeatedly. But this has not prevented some Republika reporters from bravely raising 
questions of political and ethical importance. The best among the Republika staff have 
walked a tight rope between demonstrations of respect for the government and 
maintaining the independence required to win readers and demonstrate that Muslims 
can be principled journalists. These reporters operate in an environment dominated by 
non-confessional newspapers. The success of these newspapers, Republika journalists 
have told me, owed much to their ability to demonstrate their independence, reach 
across religious lines, and address the fashions, controversies, and concerns of middle- 
class readers.
This competitive environment places Republika in a position entirely different from 
that of Media Dakwah. Whereas Media Dakwah has a ready-made audience in the ranks 
of DDII supporters, and whereas most of that audience comes from the urban lower 
and lower-middle class, Republika reporters rightly recognize that their newspaper will 
survive only if it can speak clearly and honestly to issues of concern to the Muslim 
middle- and upper-middle class. Many of these people have only recently begun to
45 A recent illustration of this fact was the "resignation" from ICMI of the outspoken head of the 
Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, in February of 1997. He was forced out after raising questions about a 
number of government policies, including several that concerned the business empires of the first family.
46 See "Three Strikes Against the Press," in The Limits o f  Openness: Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), pp. 4-20.
47 An essay that captures brilliantly this loss of political faith among the educated middle class is 
Goenawan Mohamad's, "Bohong" [Lies], a front-magazine column in Jakarta's outspoken newsweekly, 
D&R 21 (January 4-11,1997): 10-11.
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take their religious obligations seriously. Given their government and business 
connections, most are reluctant to do anything that might appear radical or 
antigovemmental. They are also uncomfortable with an Islam that is, as one Republika 
editor put it, "only about telling people what not to do." But many among these 
readers would also like to see a fairer and more transparent political-economic system. 
In this setting, Republika staff have told me, they believe their newspaper has to 
demonstrate that it is tolerant, plural, and modem, as well as pious and critical. In 
other words, the "cosmopolitanism" for which Media Dakwah faults Republika is just 
that: an effort to show that Islam is not just a matter for villagers and ulama, but a 
religion that can inspire a social conscience consonant with popular aspirations for 
openness, pluralism, and informed sophistication.
Of course, it is not just the desire to expand readership that underlies this effort. 
However much its upper ranks have become packed with government officials, ICMI 
has always included in its ranks a small but influential number of ethically principled 
and democratic-minded intellectuals. The most famous of these are, of course, such 
respected renewalist (pembaruan) intellectuals as Nurcholish Madjid and Dawam 
Rahardjo.48 However, contrary to some Western accounts, the supporters of press 
freedom and Islamic pluralism within ICMI include people of more varied theological 
and political persuasions than renewalists alone. Well known for his commitment to a 
free press, Bintang Pamungkas, the democratic legislator (and ICMI member) tried and 
imprisoned by the government for criticizing the president, has never been a 
neomodemist or theological liberal; on matters of religious principle he is closer to the 
DDII. Republika's business editor, Haidar Bagir, is well known for his commitment to 
journalistic integrity and intellectual freedom, a commitment earlier demonstrated in 
his founding of the Mizan Press, one of the most intellectually sophisticated and 
pluralistic publishing houses in the Muslim world. But on matters of worship and 
basic religious principle, Haidar is known to be rather strict or conventional. As these 
and other examples illustrate, the commitment to press freedom and openness among 
Republika staff and their supporters is not restricted to people of a theologically liberal 
persuasion, but is shared by many independent intellectuals. It is important to 
emphasize this point, because Western and Media Dakwah analyses alike have 
sometimes implied that support for Republika's independence is limited to a handful of 
liberal Muslims. In fact, however, the commitment to a spirited and pluralistic 
journalism is found across a broad spectrum of Muslim observers. From this 
perspective, the independent-minded wing of Republika and Ummat are stronger than 
sometimes believed because their interest in pluralism and transparency is shared by a 
wide array of middle-class Muslims.
Which brings us back to the DDII-led demonstrations against Republika. Though, as 
the statement that accompanied the April 17 demonstration indicated, the 
demonstrators were upset by a number of things, their ire had been especially 
provoked by a story that ran on March 31,1995 in a special supplement to Republika
48 At the time of Republika's founding, it was widely expected that Dawam Rahardjo would assume the 
role of editor-in-chief. However, at the last minute he was shunted aside in favor of Pami Hadi, a likeable 
and pious man, preferred by government officials because of his cordial ties to the then Minister of 
Information, Harmoko. On neo-modemism geneally, see Greg Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid 
and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in 
neo-Modemist Thought," Studia Islamika 4,1 (1997): 29-83.
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known as the "Friday Dialogue." This supplement is devoted to the exploration of 
new, alternative, or special-interest issues in Islam. The article in question was a two- 
page reflection on the life and thought of Ahmad Wahib. Wahib was a young, 
independent-minded student activist killed in a motorcycle accident in 1972. He had 
been a member of the "Limited Group" discussion circle in Yogyakarta that, in the late 
1960s, had engaged in boldly exploratory discussions on the nature of Islam. The 
group met under the sponsorship of Mukti Ali, a principled modernist intellectual 
tapped in 1971 to become the Minister of Religion. The Limited Group's discussions 
were wide-ranging, however, and often touched on controversial issues, such as the 
youths' dissatisfaction with what they saw as a conservative, ulama-dominated 
understanding of Islam.49
Wahib kept a diary over these years and used it to record his youthful ruminations 
and frustrations. It seems clear that he had not intended that the diaries should be 
published, at least not in their original form. However, when he died in a motorcycle 
accident in 1972, his close friend Djohan Effendi discovered the diary manuscript. In 
1982 Effendi arranged to have the diary published by LP3ES, a non-governmental 
organization and publishing house headed at the time by Dawam Rahardjo, another 
Wahib friend (and the founder and executive editor of Ulumul Qur’an). Though he was 
a Madurese from a pious santri family, Wahib's diary abounds with expressions of 
doubt about the mission of the Prophet, the proper meaning of the Qur'an, and the 
intellectual integrity of ulama. However, after every one of his introspective crises of 
faith, Wahib always returns to decisive affirmations of Islam. Nonetheless his 
statements of angst are so severe that they shocked some of Indonesia's leading ulama, 
several of whom publicly expressed their "regret" that the book had been published.
The elegization of Wahib infuriated Republika's DDII critics. In a letter of protest 
circulated at the demonstration, they cited no fewer than thirty-six passages where, 
they asserted, Wahib had insulted (menhina) Islam, the Qur'an, the Prophet, and God. 
The offending passages included statements like, "There is no Islamic law, there is only 
the history of Muhammad" (p. 60); "the Qur'an contains many passages that are no 
longer used" (p. 38); and "The Qur'an is not identical with Islam." The protesters 
argued that Wahib, who had lived for a while in a Christian boarding house when a 
student in Yogyakarta, had been influenced by ideas from "Jews, Christians, 
philosophers, and [Javanese] mystics." They also argued that Wahib's defamation of 
Islam was every bit as serious as several well-known cases where the offender had 
been tried and imprisoned. The clear suggestion was that the junior reporters who had 
authored Republika's glowing report on Wahib deserved equally severe disciplining.
Republika's editors responded to the demonstration by welcoming the protesters 
into the front office for a discussion intended to cool passions. However, many of the 
demonstrators continued to cry, “Allahu Akbar," and the newspaper staff feared 
violence. Eventually, the newspaper's editors acknowledged that mistakes had been 
made; that they hadn't understood the depth of opposition to Wahib; and that 
measures would be taken to insure that no such error would happen again. "This is
49 An English-language overview of Wahib's background and thoughts is presented in A. H. Johns's "An 
Islamic System or Islamic Values? Nucleus of a Debate in Contemporary Indonesia," in W. Roff, Islam and 
the Political Economy o f Meaning: Comparative Studies o f Muslim Discourse (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 
254-280.
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our mistake, because we weren't sufficiently careful in selecting articles to be 
published for that day," said the assistant editor S. Sinansari Ecip.50 Though the 
demonstrators demanded their dismissal, the young reporters responsible for the 
article were not fired, but moved from the reporting staff to the less visible research 
department. It did not escape the attention of Republika staff that the demoted reporters 
were well known not only for their interest in Wahib, but for their sympathy for the 
democratic ideas of "transformative" Islam as well.51
The second DDII demonstration at the Republika office occurred on December 30, 
1996. This time the demonstrators reiterated their earlier criticisms, that Republika is too 
cosmopolitan, prone to celebrity-mongering, and insensitive to Islamic morality. 
However, there was also something new to the demonstrators' broadside, and to the 
story that accompanied the demonstration in the January 1997 edition of Media 
Dakwah. Copies of the materials the demonstrators viewed as offensive were sent to 
leading ulama, directors of religious schools, ICMI officers—and senior officers in the 
Indonesian armed forces. Among the documents were letters from Taufiq Ismail, a 
respected Muslim poet well known for his ferocious hostility to anything emanating 
from the political Left, and K. H. A. Kholil Ridwan, an alim with ties to the DDII.
The demonstrators took issue with several Republika stories and actions. They 
condemned the newspaper for wishing "Selamat Berhari Natal" [A Blessed Christmas] 
to Indonesia's Christian community. This gesture, they explained, contradicted recent 
legal pronouncements of the state-sponsored Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia) to the effect that to wish someone Holy Christmas was, in effect, to 
recognize the legitimacy of Christian belief, and was thus forbidden. The 
demonstrators also expressed anger at Republika’s favorable review of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger's new Christmas comedy entitled (in its Indonesia release) "Jingle All 
the Way."
There were other points of contention, but the protesters' central grievance 
concerned the newspaper's coverage of the July 27 attack on the PDI headquarters; the 
arrest and trial of the leaders of the Partai Rakyat Demokrasi (the People's Democratic 
Party, or PRD), whom the government at first blamed for the subsequent riots; and an 
interview the newspaper had run with retired Lieutenant General Soebijatko 
Prawirasoebrata. General Soebijatko is an associate of retired General Rudini, a 
friendly critic of the government; among armed-forces retirees, General Soebijatko is 
recognized as a considered and intelligent voice for moderate political reform.
In a sharply worded attack, the demonstrators' letters denounced Republika as 
biased and contrary to the interests of Muslims, the nation—and the armed forces. 
Even Lieutenant General Soebijakto was condemned for presenting "perspectives [that 
are] very pro-PRD." To direct a charge like the latter against a military retiree as 
respected as General Soebijakto is, in the Indonesian context, nothing less than
5® As quoted in one of the few magazines to run a story on the incident, "Didemo Khalayak Sendiri" 
[Demonstrated Against by Their Own Public], Sinar (April 22,1995): 82.
51 Remarkable by the standards of any part of the Muslim world, two of the most influential exponents of 
transformative Islam are Masdar F. Mas'udi and Moeslim Abdurrahman. Masdar comes from a NU 
background, Moeslim from Muhammadiyah. For illustrations of their bold ideas, see Moeslim 
Abdurrahman, Islam Transformatif (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1995), and Masdar Mas'udi, Islam dan Hak- 
Hak Reproduksi Perempuan (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).
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shocking. Having condemned the PRD as communist, the demonstrators were by 
implication saying that, intentionally or not, General Soebijakto was acting like a 
communist sympathizer. Republika was criticized in similar terms for providing 
"support to leaders and movements of the left." Particularly offensive in the protesters' 
eyes were interviews Republika had run with PRD leaders and activists associated with 
the progressive Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy (SMID, Solidaritas 
Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi).
It is important to remember that Republika's coverage of the July 27 incident and the 
arrest of the PRD leaders had originally been notably unsympathetic to both the PRD 
and Megawati supporters. At first the newspaper had gone along with the government 
prosecutor's line, or, at the very least, had chosen not to question it openly. However, 
in the days following the incident, as the government identified the PRD as the 
masterminds of the July 27 riots and as a communist front group, many in Indonesia, 
including many in the Muslim community and military, began to questions the 
wisdom of these charges. Through leaks and public comments, it became apparent that 
a number of figures in the Armed Forces had opposed the attack on the PDI 
headquarters, fearing it would only tarnish ABRI's image. Eventually, public 
skepticism toward the government case became so strong that prosecutors changed the 
charges against the party's leaders. Rather than identifying PRD leaders as 
masterminds of the July 27 disturbances, they charged them with subversion, "hatred 
of the government," and opposition to the Pancasila.
This change caused deep embarrassment among the independent-minded staff at 
Republika, who realized that they had been too uncritical in their earlier reporting of the 
government's case. Regretting the earlier rush to judgment, Republika's reporters were 
determined to acknowledge their error and demonstrate that they were capable of fair 
and objective journalism, even when reporting on the prodemocracy Left or on issues 
to which some Muslims might object. There was a journalistic principle to be defended, 
I was told by one such reporter. Thus, in several prominent stories, the newspaper 
presented the case against the PRD in rich detail, and in a manner which—given 
government prosecutors' mishandling of the case—led many readers to doubt the 
credibility of the government charge. A planned series of in-depth reports on the PRD 
was never completed, however, because after publication of the first such report 
Republika's editors were bombarded with protests from high-ranking government 
officials. Overruling their junior reporters, the newspaper's editors apologized in print, 
announcing that it was unwise to run additional stories while the case against the PRD 
was pending.
The demonstrators outside the Republika office had no such qualms about the PRD 
or the government's efforts. Their "Statement of Concern to the (Islamic?) Newspaper 
Republika" reiterated the government's earlier charges about the PRD, and condemned 
Republika's nuanced reporting in the sharpest of terms:
Republika's support for movements and intellectuals of the Left has been expressed 
continuously and repeatedly. . . . The bias and support of Republika toward the 
PRD represents a slandering of the Islamic community's effort to make people 
aware of the danger of the revival of communism in Indonesia. . . . Republika
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clearly also has challenged President Soeharto who has affirmed that the PRD is
identical with communism.52
There is much more to the demonstrators' document and the Media Dakwah special 
report that accompanied it. The central theme of both statements, however, was that 
Republika was supporting the communist Left, sowing discord in the Muslim 
community, and antagonizing heretofore cordial ties with the Indonesian armed 
forces. The demonstrators concluded their statement with an appeal to the Department 
of Information (which licenses the press), the governmental Council of Indonesian 
Ulama (MUI), and ICMI officers to investigate the newspaper's staff. In the meantime, 
they urged Muslims to cancel their subscriptions, emphasizing, "It is dangerous, if in 
the name of Islam and supported by the Muslim community, Republika deceives and 
misleads the Muslim community itself."
Conclusion: The Struggle for a Public Sphere
Many reporters in the Jakarta community, both in the Muslim and nonconfessional 
press, were convinced that the DDII campaign against Republika had been engineered 
by a small, antireform faction in the intelligence services. Rumors had it that those 
security officials had been angered by Republika efforts to provide balanced reporting 
on the PRD and the July 27 violence. These sources are quick to point out that the 
armed forces themselves were far from agreed on the wisdom of the July 27 assault on 
the PDI. It is no secret that many high-ranking ABRI officers objected to the campaign 
against Megawati, and feared that her elimination would only increase the chances of 
the ICMI head, B. J. Habibie, succeeding President Soeharto. Observers who make this 
argument, claiming the demonstration against Republika was engineered by 
intelligence officials, take pains to point out that only a small faction in those services 
was responsible, not security or military officials as a whole.
DDII officials reject such charges as specious slanders designed to split the Muslim 
community and create tensions between Muslims and the armed forces. Given the 
highly charged atmosphere in Jakarta in late 1996 and 1997, the possibility that there 
was indeed such a rumor campaign against the DDII cannot be ruled out. Whatever 
the truth in this instance, however, the evidence of Media Dakwah's own reporting after 
the events of July 27 makes clear that, after years of marginalization, the DDII 
leadership has concluded that it must take full advantage of the thaw in relations with 
(some in) the government, and to do so means taking a hardline on recent political 
events. This is a serious gamble, and one that represents a departure from the 
principled position earlier staked out by Anwar Harjono, the current DDII chairman. 
As a member of the Petition of 50 during the 1980s and early 1990s, Harjono regularly 
joined other prominent critics of the government in raising pointed questions about 
democracy and social justice.
The shift in the DDII's public posture is also one about which some moderate DDII 
officials continue in private to express concern. Nonetheless, in the months following 
the July 27 incident, Media Dakwah ran numerous special reports reviewing in detail the 
threat of communism, the communist roots of the PRD, and Muslims' proud role in the
52 "Pemyataan Sikap Keprihatinan terhadap Surat Kabar (Islam?) Republika," a statement presented to 
Republika, December 30,1996.
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extermination of the PKI during 1965-1966. DDII-linked groups have also launched 
attacks on government critics and human-rights advocates, characterizing human 
rights as a Western fraud. Finally, and most surprising for some reform-minded 
Muslims (including some affiliated with the DDII), the magazine has also joined the 
attack on Sri Bintang Pamungkas, the Muslim legislator imprisoned for criticizing the 
president and calling for greater democratization. Before 1996, Media Dakwah had 
portrayed Sri Bintang as a pious Muslim and person of deep political conviction; 
sometimes the magazine used Sri Bintang's statements to introduce general criticisms 
of corruption and official policy.53 Deliberate or not, in presenting these new positions 
Media Dakwah has taken a stand noticeably closer to that of anti-reformists in the 
government.
It is an understatement to say that (asymmetrical) collaboration between civilians 
and the military is nothing new in Indonesian politics; it has been the bedrock of New 
Order politics. Given the uncertain outcome of today's elite spats and the decisive role 
of the military in any future scenario, it is also understandable that civilian reformists 
and hardliners alike are eager to court military support. As long as the Indonesian 
military's doctrine of dwifungsi ("dual responsibility," i.e. the military's duty to involve 
itself in domestic politics as well as defense) remains in place, there is in principle 
nothing unusual or improper about such contacts. In fact, if the lessons of democratic 
reform in other parts of the developing world are relevant here, such contacts will have 
to be expanded if and when there is to be meaningful reform.54 However, many 
people, including leading ABRI officials, believe that when such collaboration is 
conducted off-stage in a netherworld of secret deals and alliances, it undermines both 
the armed forces' mission and the prospects for orderly change.
Whether such offstage influences are at work in the current conflict between 
Republika and its DDII critics cannot be decisively proven. Whether such hidden 
alliances may also be behind the "anti-Christian" riots that swept Indonesia in 1996 is 
also unclear. However, many people are convinced there is a link between these two 
events. It is widely believed that much of the "religious" violence in 1996 and 1997 was 
organized by shadowy third forces; President Soeharto himself believes this to be the 
case. Just who those forces are, however, is not something on which there is much 
agreement. Where there is a broader consensus among political observers is in the 
belief that tensions among the ruling elite have recently heated up and may well be 
prompting certain individuals to resort to tactics that, in another time or place, they 
might have regarded as inappropriate and dangerous.
53 See the harsh report on Sri Bintang, for example, in the April 1997 issue of Media Dakwah, "L’lah Bintang 
dengan Lebaran Politik," pp. 8-10.
54 A point aptly summarized in a recent overview of the Indonesian military: "The emergence of a truly 
independent political party in New Order Indonesia will not be possibile without tacit approval from at 
least a fragment of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the possibility of a civilian politician such as Megawati 
making a serious run at the Presidency will only be possible if a fraction of the military elite—either active 
or retired—provides support and a degree of protection." See the Editors, "The Indonesian Military in the 
Mid-1990s: Political Maneuvering or Structural Change?" Indonesia 63 (April 1997): 105.
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As reformers like Adnan Buyung Nasution have long emphasized,55 offstage deal­
making makes it difficult to advance the cause of openness and accountability in 
politics and the mass media. If they have indeed played a role in recent events, 
subterfuge alliances violate the formal rules even of the existing Indonesian political 
order and make politics vulnerable to big-power plays. They also undermine the 
efforts of many decent Indonesians attempting to make the press a foundation for 
public dialogue and accountability.
These then are the issues affecting the struggle for a Muslim press in contemporary 
Indonesia. They are weighty issues indeed. However much they might wish otherwise, 
the strategies of the Muslim protagonists in this struggle have not been determined by 
the timeless values of universal Islam or, as certain western political scientists would 
have it, unchanging "civilizational" identities. There are here deeply different varieties 
of political Islam. Their struggle shows all too clearly the constraints of Indonesia's 
present political system, and hints at the compromises even principled players may 
have been obliged to make. It is a sign of the times in contemporary Indonesia that 
there are well-meaning individuals on all sides wondering whether some among their 
comrades might have struck the wrong deal, and whether it should not have been 
otherwise.
55 The issue with which I am concerned here, the deleterious impact of offstage intrigues on democracy's 
possibility, is, of course, the focus of Buyung's own efforts to improve Indonesia's legal system, and of his 
masterful, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal Study o f the Indonesian 
Konstituante 1956-1959 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992).

